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The Influence of Price Changes on Net WorthCHAPTER 4.
Summary and Significance of Findings
PART Two deals with the relations between price changes and the
changes in net worth (or wealth) of various groups in the American
economy since the turn of the century. (Net worth is defined here
as the difference between the current value of assets and of liabilities.)
The findings should be read with three important qualifications in
mind in order that the data and the conclusions drawn from them
should not be misunderstood.
First, this study deals with the influence of price change only on net
worth. The effects on income are probably more important to the
economic welfare of most groups and these income effects may differ
in intensity and sometimes even in direction from net worth effects.
Second, the data used here were not collectedfor the purpose of
studying this question and therefore are not ideally suited to it. The
sectors distinguished in the national balance sheets are too broad to
permit us to identify the groups whose portfolios are most susceptible
to price changes or best placed to benefit from them. Even the sample
data for households, which are drawn on in Chapter 8, reveal only
some of the characteristics associated with household balance sheet po-
sitions, and leave much of the variability still unaccounted for.
Third, the estimates of net worth and changes therein, and the
decomposition of these changes into saving and price effects, are mostly
by-products of the compilation of national and sectoral balance sheets.
They therefore suffer from all the defects of the balance sheets, par-
ticularly the weakness of the estimates for the early years and for cer-
tain sectors, and the difficulties involved in measuring asset prices,
especially in allowing for quality changes.
Despite the caution used in interpretation, the findings must still be
regarded as preliminary and tentative. This is the first quantitative
treatment of the relation of price changes to net worth that embraces
all sectors of the economy and covers the postwar period as well as the
half century preceding jt.1 Its purpose is mainly exploratory: to use
existing data to suggest hypotheses, to identify problems that need
further investigation, to indicate the information required to investi-
gate them more thoroughly, and to encourage additional study of the
subject.
a briefer treatment, ending in 1949, see R. W. Goldsmith, A Study of Saving
in the United States, Vol. I, Princeton, 1955, Pp. 193-200.
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Summary of Findings
TRENDS IN NET WORTH
1. The total net worth of all economic units in the United States rose
from appràximately $110 billion in 1900 to almost $2,250 billion at the
end of 1958. Real net worth (calculated by using the GNP deflator)
multiplied five times in the same interval and real net worth per capita
more than doubled.
2. There were large differences in rates of growth of net worth
among the main sectors of the economy. Over the period as a whole,
the net worth of state and local governments grew forty times, that of
nonfarm households and corporations about twenty-five times, and
that of agriculture and unincorporated business roughly seven and
fourteen times, respectively. Federal government net worth declined as
borrowing for war and defense first wiped out the small positive
amount existing before World War I and then turned it into a large
negative amount in later years.
8. In the postwar years there was less diversity among the sectors
in the growth of net worth. The most slowly growing sector—still agri-
culture—increased its net worth by 90 per cent, while the net worth of
corporations and finance—the most rapidly growing sectors—rose by
slightly over 200 per cent.
PRICE IRENDS
1. Taken as a whole, the period from 1900 to 1958 or 1962 was one of
rising prices, with the price index underlying deflated gross national
product (our measure of the general price level) approximately quad.
rupling. Of the nine intervals into which we have divided the 1900.58
period, the three covering war and immediate postwar years—1912-22,
1939-45, and 1945-49—showed the most rapid price increases. One
period—1922-29—--was characterized by price stability, one—1929-33—
by severe price decline, and the other four by rises of about 1 to 3 per
cent annually, as was 1958-62 also.
2. Aside from the period during and shortly after World War II,
when the increase in tangible asset prices exceeded the rise in the
general price level, the two indexes moved similarly. Common stock
prices, which rose somewhat more than the other two over the whole
period, seemed completely unrelated to them in the short run. Stock
prices fell to low levels in both wars, when the price level was rising.
They also fell even more sharply during the 1930's, when the general
price level was declining. They rose most rapidly during periods of
stability or moderate rises in the general price level—from 1922 to
1929 and from 1949 to 1958.
hOSUMMARY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS
S. Sensitive-asset price indexes for the major sectors of the economy
reflect the differences between stock and other asset prices. Corpora-
tions and households, the main holders of common stock, showed gains
in asset prices in 1922-29 when other sectors suffered price declines, and
larger gains than the other sectors in 1958-58. They also underwent the
largest price declines, outside of agriculture, in 1929-33. The agricul-
tural sector's net worth benefited particularly from a sharp rise in farm
land prices between 1900 and 1912.
4. Data on asset portfolios by type of household, provided by Sur-
veys of Consumer Finances and by federal estate tax data, permit
the construction of price indexes covering various periods between
1944 and 1962 for groups of households. Because these were years
when the stock price index far outdistanced the general price level,
the large variation among the estimated sensitive-asset price indexes
rests mainly on differences in the proportion of the portfolio in-
vested in common stock. Thus, during these years, higher income and
wealth groups experienced much larger asset price increases than less
affluent families. High-income, older, and retired renters, who tended
to have the highest stock ownership proportions, enjoyed the greatest
rise in asset prices.
NET WORTH CHANGES AND PRICE CHANGES
I. The rate of growth of net worth has varied considerably since 1900.
The most rapid increases have taken place since World War II; before
that, the two wartime periods and 1922-29 showed the fastest growth.
2. Real net worth grew most.rapidly during stock price booms: 1922-
29 was the leader among the nine periods, followed by 1953-58 and
1949-53. The first two periods were particularly favorable for nonfarm
households, the main owners of common stock.
3. Changes in net worth reflect net saving and equity financing as
well as a residual due mainly to price changes but also to intersectoral
transfers of assets and shifts in the composition of asset portfolios. This
residual accounted for almost 65 per cent of total net worth changes
between 1900 and 1958, and about the same proportion in the postwar
years. Residual changes formed the largest proportion of changes in
net worth for agriculture and unincorporated business, the smallest for
households. However, the household sector residual was larger in abso-
lute amounts than all the others combined. For the federal govern-
ment, price increases on tangible assets offset about one-sixth of net
dissaving.
4. The deflated residual (the difference between deflated change in
net worth and deflated saving and net equity issues) is the result of the
effect on price-sensitive assets of differences between asset price and
general price movements, and of the effect on monetary assets and ha-
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bilities of the changes in the general price level. These deflated
residuals accounted for roughly a third of the total change in real net
worth for all sectors combined, and they were concentrated in the
periods when stock prices jumped ahead of the general price level—
1922-29 and 1949-58. The federal government enjoyed the largest abso-
lute real capital gains among the sectors, and also the largest in relation
to total net worth changes. Its greatest gains were in 1939-45 and
1945-49. as price level increases cut the real value of the federal debt.'
The household sector made its largest gains in 1922-29 and 1953-58
and suffered its largest real loss in 1929-33; these changes reflect pri-
marily changes in real stock prices.
LEVERAGE RATIOS
1. Residual net worth changes (aside from transfers, about which we
have no information) consist of capital gains and losses on assets held
throughout the period and on assets bought or sold during the period.
For any sector, the former can be resolved into effects of asset price
changes and the influence of the initial structure of assets and liabilities.
A sector's balance sheet structure can be summarized by the leverage
ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the change in value of initial net
worth to the asset price change that caused it and is expressed as the
ratio of the current value of price-sensitive assets to net worth.
For the entire economy, the leverage ratio is necessarily close to
unity because the value of claims equals the value of liabilities (aside
from foreign claims and liabilities, which are not of great importance
for the United States) so that the rate of change in net worth is close
to that of price-sensitive assets. But this is not true for sectors or sub-
sectors of the economy.
2. The combination of leverage ratios with sectoral asset price in-
dexes accounts for a high proportion of observed residual net worth
changes for major sectors in the postwar years and during the two
world wars, but not for earlier periods. Its success in estimating residual
net worth changes rests on the stability of leverage ratio relationships
—the fact that, for example, households persistently have low, leverage
ratios, corporations and state and local governments high ones, and the
federal government negative ratios and negative net worth. This sta-
bility and the correlation of expected with actual net worth changes
encourage the use of leverage ratios for smaller sectors in the search for
the groups most susceptible to the impact of price changes on their
net worth.
3. Although leverage ratios did not differ greatly among the main
sectors (aside from the negative figure for the federal government),
breakdowns of the household sector by type revealed a much wider
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range. The most significant differentiating variable was housing status:
the breakdown into renters, home-owners with mortgages, and home-
owners without mortgages. Data for both 1950 and 1958 indicate that
with very few exceptions home-owners with mortgages had the highest
leverage ratios and renters the lowest at every income level, in every
occupation, and at every age. Ratios for owners of mortgaged homes
were generally above unity, while those for renters were frequently
below .50, particularly among those in the lower income and occupa-
tional groups.
4. The other variable consistently associated with the leverage ratio
was age. Especially among home-owners with mortgages, the younger
families showed the highest ratios and older families considerably
lower ones. These relationships with family characteristics were not
only strong, but were remarkably consistent among the several surveys
despite the differences in method and the eight-year interval which
included very sharp rises in stock prices.
5. Leverage ratios by type of household can be used in conjunction
with corresponding price indexes to yield estimated or expected
changes in net worth for 1949-58. In this period renters with high in-
comes and older or retired renters apparently offset the losses implied
by their low leverage ratios with large capital gains on common stock.
Presumed losses in real net worth were, however, substantial among
younger renters and those with low incomes.
Significance of Findings
There are two important questions on the relation between price
changes and net worth changes which could be studied using national
and sectoral balance sheets. One is how the economy and its sectors ad-
just their asset portfolios and debt ratios to past and expected changes
in asset and other prices. The other, which is the one examined here, is
how the structure of assets and debt transforms price changes into net
worth changes. The importance of the second question depends on the
stability of sectoral balance sheet structure. If it shifted radically over
short periods, the initial balance sheet would have little relevance for
a period's net worth changes; a fairly stable structure, on the other
hand, could provide a reasonably accurate projection of at least that
part of the change in net worth not accounted for by net saving and
equity issues.
The findings of this study suggest considerable, but by no means
complete, stability. Leverage ratios, for example, do change from year
to year. It is the major relationships among groups that have remained
fairly consistent over time: the low leverage ratios of households corn-
"3INFLUENCE OF PRiCE CHANGES ON NET WORTH
pared to the high ones for corporations and the negative ratios of the
federal government, and the relations of leverage ratios to age and
housing status.
Despite the stability of some of these relationships, the very fact
that balance sheet structure, as measured by leverage ratios, influences
the change in net worth implies that price changes bring about leverage
ratio changes too. A topic for further investigation, not developed
here, is the extent to which groups have accepted passively the changes
in balance sheet structure and leverage ratio caused by price move-
ments or have, on the contrary, taken action to restore or move further
away from the original structure. This could be done by replacing
price-sensitive by monetary assets, for example, or by acquiring new
assets and debt in proportions different from the initial ones. The non-
farm 'household sector as a whole and the federal government seem to
have accepted most of the effects of asset price changes since World
War II. Most of the time in those years households as well as other
sectors have moved toward higher leverage ratios than those which
price changes alone would have brought about. An exception was the
behavior of households in 1953-58 when they increased their leverage
ratios less than projected.
Some of the data in Part Three of this volume on the balance sheet
structure of housing' suggest th'at households do make considerable
shifts in asset-debt ratios on at least this important asset. They have
clearly not permitted the effects of price changes and debt repayment
automatically to alter their balance sheet positions. It would be inter-
esting to perform the same calculation for groups within the household
sector, but no data comparable to 1950 are available for 1958. Even if
we could trace the same families from 1949 to 1958, the comparison
would be made more difficult by' the fact that the characteristics of an
individual family would be likely to have changed in eight years. It is
worth, noting that a projection of leverage ratios by groups of house-
holds from 1949 to 1958 would not alter the main relationships dis-
cussed here, despite the great changes in asset prices.
The leverage ratios, and the structure of balance sheets in general,
appear to be sufficiently consistent to imply several conclusions about
the effects on net worth of the two distinctly different types of price
movement that can be identified. The first of these is a rise in the
general price level, such as occurred in the war and postwar periods,
1912-22 and 1939-49. The second is a shift in the real price of common
stocks—a growth or decline at a more rapid rate than the general price
level or even a movement in the opposite direction.
With the present level of federal debt, a rise in the general price level
transfers real net worth from the household sector, whose leverage
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ratios are the lowest of the main sectors, to the federal government.
Within the household sector, it tends to strike particularly at the net
worth of renters. Among renters, those in the lower-income classes and
the higher-age groups suffer the greatest losses in real net worth.
Owners of mortgage-free homes face smaller losses and owners of mort-
gaged homes, particularly the younger ones, stand to make substantial
gains in their real net worth. Age seems to be an unfavorable factor
among both renters and owners of mortgaged homes and among fam-
ilies in general, regardless of housing status.
A protracted rise in stock prices more rapid than that in the general
price level, such as those that took place in ] 922-29 and 1949-58, has
quite different effects. Low-income renters fare badly, as in a general
price level increase, but upper-income renters are protected by their
high stock ownership ratio which can offset the influence of their lOw
leverage ratios. The age relationship is also reversed; it is the older
renters and owners of mortgage-free homes whose real net worth ad-
vances while the younger ones suffer losses. The greatest gains in real
net worth in 1949-58 presumably were made by retired renters and
renters over 65.
How powerful such a movement in stock prices can be is shown by
the fact that the sharp rise in the 1950's substantially counteracted the
decrease in the inequality in the distribution of personal wealth that
had occurred in the preceding twenty years.2
2Lampmanestimates that the share of the wealthiest 0.5 per cent of the population
in total personal sector equity, which declined fromto 19 per cent between 1922
and 1949, had increased to 25 per cent by 1956 (Robert J. Lampman, The Share of
Top Wealth-Holders in National Wealth, 1922-56, Princeton for NBER, 1962, Table
93, p. 202). The last five years are likely to have witnessed another, though smaller,
increase in this share.
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